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Unlike other primates, human populations are often di­
vided into ethnic groups that have self-ascribed mem­
bership and are marked by seemingly arbitrary traits 
such as distinctive styles of dress or speech (Barth 1969, 
1981). The modern understanding that ethnic identities 
are flexible and ethnic boundaries porous makes the or­
igin and existence of such groups problematic because 
the movement of people and ideas between groups will 
tend to attenuate group differences. Thus, the persis­
tence of existing boundaries and the birth of new ones 
suggests that there must be social processes that resist 
the homogenizing effects of migration and the strategic 
adoption of ethnic identities.
One recurring intuition in the social sciences is that, 
since ethnic markers signal ethnic group membership 
and ethnic groups are often loci of cooperation, markers 
persist because they allow people to direct altruistic be­
havior selectively toward coethnics (Van den Berghe 
1981, Nettle and Dunbar 1997). On closer analysis, how­
ever, this argument turns out not to be cogent. Altruism 
can evolve only if some cue allows altruists to interact 
with each other preferentially so that they receive a dis­
proportionate share of the benefits of altruism. One such 
cue is kinship (Hamilton 1964), and another is previous 
behavior (Trivers 1972, Axelrod 1984). Another idea is 
that selection might favor altruists who carried an ex­
ternal, visible marker that would allow them to limit 
their cooperation to others who exhibited the marker. 
However, evolutionary theorists argue that this mech­
anism is unlikely to be important (Hamilton 1964, Gra- 
fen 1990). Nonaltruists with the marker do best because 
they get the benefit without paying the cost. Thus, if 
any process breaks up the association between the co­
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operator strategies and the markers, such individuals 
will rapidly proliferate and altruists will disappear.
Here we argue that markers function to allow indi­
viduals to interact with others who share their social 
norms. We present a simple mathematical model show­
ing that marked groups can arise and persist if three em­
pirically plausible conditions are satisfied: (i) Social be­
havior in groups is regulated by norms in such a way 
that interactions between individuals who share beliefs 
about how people should behave yield higher payoffs 
than interactions among people with discordant beliefs. 
(2) People preferentially interact with people with whom 
they share easily observable traits like dress style or di­
alect. (3) People imitate successful people, with the result 
that behaviors that lead to higher payoffs tend to spread. 
We also show that the preference to interact with people 
with markers like one's own may be favored by natural 
selection under plausible conditions. We conclude by 
outlining several qualitative, empirically testable pre­
dictions of our model.
A S IM P L E  M O D E L  O F T H E  E V O L U T IO N  O F E T H N IC  
M A R K E R S
Consider a population divided into a number of large 
groups. In each time period, each individual interacts 
with another individual from the same group. People's 
behavior in these interactions depends on culturally ac­
quired beliefs. We will refer to this culturally transmitted 
belief as the behavioral trait. There are two alternative 
beliefs, labeled 1 and o. Individuals' payoffs from the 
social interaction depend on their own behavior and the 
behavior of their partners in the way given in table 1. 
This simple coordination game is meant to capture the 
intuition that many real social interactions go well if 
people have the same beliefs about proper behavior. It is 
likely that human societies face many problems of this 
kind. An example familiar to many of us is the problems 
in cross-cultural communication that result from differ­
ent expectations about interactions and codes for com­
municating (Gumperz 1982). The parameter 5 measures 
the strength of this effect.
We also assume that it is difficult to determine another 
individual's beliefs about proper behavior before an in­
teraction occurs. Given the large number of norms and 
the fact that some of them will be used only a few times 
in one's lifetime (Nave 2000), people cannot always re­
liably predict the behavior of everyone they must inter­
act with or even predict their own behavior, since many 
such norms are unconsciously held. Much the same ar­
gument can be made for rules enforced by third-party 
punishment. A stranger who moves to a new village can­
not guess ahead of time all of the social rules that reg­
ulate behavior in his new home. People may be able to 
tell him some of the things that he needs to know, but 
it is still likely that he will make many costly social 
blunders, perhaps even run afoul of basic moral princi­
ples (field anthropologists should be familiar with this
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Payoffs in the Coordination Game
Player 2's Behavior
Player i ' s Behavior 1 0
1 i + 5 1
0 1 i + 5
n o t e :  Payoffs shown for player i ; 5 is assumed
to be positive.
sort of problem). As long as people are sometimes ig­
norant in these ways, people with uncommon behaviors 
will be at a disadvantage, and the model targets these 
situations, not the entire scope of interaction.
Of course, people have many traits, such as dialect, 
clothing style, and cuisine, that can be observed, and 
often these traits are the basis of assortative social in­
teraction. To formalize this idea, we assume that there 
is also a readily observable marker trait. This trait also 
has variants, labeled o and 1, and we assume that indi­
viduals tend to interact with others who have the same 
variant of marker trait. The strength of this propensity 
is given by the parameter e. When e =  1, individuals 
interact at random; when e =  o, they always interact 
with someone with the same marker trait.
There is much evidence that people who do well in 
life are more likely to be imitated (Henrich and Gil- 
White 2000). To incorporate this process, we assume that 
the probability that an individual with behavior i and 
marker 7 will be imitated is proportional to WJ;/W, where 
W is the average payoff in the group. This means that 
combinations of behavior and marker that lead to higher 
than average payoffs w ill be more likely to be imitated 
(see Gintis 2000 for derivation).
With these assumptions it is possible to derive ex­
pressions that describe how imitation and social inter­
action change the frequency of the behavior and marker 
traits in each group. The change in the fraction of the 
people with marker 1 within a group, p u is
Ap, =  &U[[px - p 0)[l -  [1 -  <?]] }, (1)
where R{ = D/[UV)V2} is the correlation of behavior and 
marker, U and V are the variances of behavior and 
marker, and D is the covariance between marker and 
behavior. If R = 1, everyone who has marker 1 also has 
behavior i; if R = — 1, then everyone who has marker 
1 has behavior o, and if R =  o the traits are randomly 
associated. Equation 1 says that if more individuals use 
behavior 1 than behavior o, it increases; if fewer indi­
viduals use it, it decreases. The rate at which this occurs 
depends on whether the marker allows individuals to 
interact preferentially with people who have the same 
behavior. When R2 is near one, most individuals with a 
given behavior have the same marker, and if e is small 
they almost always interact with individuals with the 
same behavior as themselves and thus there is little ad­
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vantage in having the common behavior. When R2 is near 
zero, most interactions occur at random and individuals 
with the most common behavior have an advantage.
The change in frequency of the marker i, qv is ap­
proximately given by
A q ^ l d D i P i - p o ) ^ - ^ .  (2)
This expression is valid when the covariance between 
marker and behavior is small—when individuals' mark­
ers predict little about their behavior. When D is positive, 
marker 1 is associated with behavior 1, and if behavior 
1 increases, so does marker 1. The complete expression 
for the change in q, shows that this effect decreases as 
D becomes larger.
Because the effects of social interaction and learning 
depend critically on the covariance between behavior 
and marker (D), we also need to know how they affect 
the covariance. Social interaction and imitation increase 
covariance between marker and behavior when the co­
variance is small. The reason is simple: individuals with 
the most common combinations of behavior and marker 
are more likely to interact with others with the same 
behavior and thus achieve a higher payoff.
We then represent population mixing due to inter­
marriage, relocation, and other factors with a migration 
phase which removes a proportion m of each group and 
replaces it with migrants drawn from neighboring 
groups. Clearly, such mixing will reduce the differences 
in the frequencies of both behavior and marker between 
neighboring groups. However, migration also has a less 
obvious and very important effect: as long there is any 
difference in the frequencies of marker and behavior be­
tween neighboring groups, migration increases the co­
variance between marker and behavior within groups:
A D  = m{D - D  + {p1 - p 1 )(<?, -  <?,)], (3)
where p u q u and D  are the average frequencies of be­
havior and marker and the covariance between behavior 
and marker in neighboring groups that provide immi­
grants. To understand why mixing increases the covar­
iance within groups, consider the case in which the fre­
quency of marker and behavior is 0.9 in one group and
0.1 in a second group. Further suppose that the covari­
ance between marker and behavior within both groups 
is zero, and therefore the marker is useless as a predictor 
of behavior. Now suppose that we mix the two groups 
completely. Most of the individuals coming into the first 
group will carry both marker and behavior o, while those 
coming into the second will carry both marker and be­
havior 1. The frequency of both markers and both be­
haviors will be 0.5, but most (82%) of the individuals in 
the population will be either 1 ,1  or 0,0, with the result 
that markers are now good predictors of behavior within 
groups.
Finally, suppose that individuals sometimes acquire 
marker and behavior traits from different individuals,
which leads to the randomization of behavior and 
marker—a process we term recombination. Recombi­
nation has no effect on the frequencies of behavior and 
marker, but it reduces the covariance between marker 
and behavior at a rate proportional to 1.
S IM U L A T IO N  R E S U L T S
We have derived recursions that give the net effect of 
imitation, migration, and recombination on the frequen­
cies of behavior and marker and the covariance between 
them. However, these recursions are too complex to 
solve analytically, and we have, therefore, relied on nu­
merical simulation. We begin by describing simulations 
of the model when there are only two interacting pop­
ulations. This system provides an intuition for the pro­
cesses that sometimes give rise to marked groups. We 
then explore the parameter space of the model, varying 
e (the chance of interacting at random), m (migration), 8 
(the effects of social behavior on individual welfare), and 
1  (the rate of recombination) to map the range of con­
ditions under which marked groups arise. Finally, we 
generalize the model, allowing larger numbers of popu­
lations and a general coordination game structure. These 
analyses suggest that the simple model is relatively 
robust.
1. Stable behavioral differences between groups usu­
ally become ethnically marked. Social interaction alone 
can lead to the evolution of stable differences in behavior 
between two groups. People with more common behav­
iors achieve higher payoffs in the coordination game and 
are more likely to be imitated. Thus if one behavior is 
initially common in one group and the alternative be­
havior is initially common in the other group, payoffs 
from social behavior coupled with imitation of the suc­
cessful w ill cause the groups to become more different. 
If the diversifying effect of payoff-biased imitation is suf­
ficiently strong compared with the homogenizing effect 
of migration, the two populations will reach an equilib­
rium at which behavior 1 is common in group 1 and 
behavior 2 in group 2. In contrast, if the rate of mixing 
is too high or if initially the same behavior is common 
in both populations, only one behavior will be present 
in both populations at equilibrium.
If stable behavioral differences between groups exist, 
each behavior can become associated with a different 
marker variant—behavior 1 will, for example, be asso­
ciated with marker o and behavior o with marker 1. Fig­
ure 1 illustrates this dynamic. Initially behavior 1 is 
more common in population 1 and less common in pop­
ulation 2. Marker o is initially more common than 
marker 1 in both populations but relatively more com­
mon in population 2 than in population 1. There is no 
initial covariance within populations. At first, rare-type 
disadvantage causes behavior 1 to become more common 
in population 1 and behavior o in population 2. At the 
same time, migration generates a negative covariance 
between marker and behavior so that behavior 1 tends 
to co-occur with marker o and marker o with behavior
1. This in turn strengthens the forces increasing the dif-
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Time
F i g .  1 . The frequencies of each the four combinations 
of behavior and marker over time in each of two pop­
ulations for m  =  0.02s, e =  0.2s, and r =  0.1. The 
behaviors are denoted by the shape of the symbol, cir­
cle ( =  o) or square ( =  1), and the markers are de­
noted by color, black ( =  o) or white ( =  j). Initially 
behavior 1  (squares) has frequency 0.55 in population 
1  and 0.4s in population 2. Marker o (black) is ini­
tially more common than marker 1  in both popula­
tions but relatively more common in population 1  (qn 
=  0.8) than in population 2 (q12 =  0.7).
ferences between the populations in frequencies of 
marker and behavior, which then generates greater co­
variance. This positive feedback process (fig. 2) continues 
until a symmetrical equilibrium is reached at which a 
different behavior is common in each population and 
each behavior is associated with a different marker. The 
adaptive behaviors have become symbolically marked, 
even though the same marker was initially common in 
both groups.
However, migration and recombination oppose the 
positive feedback process described above. Migration 
tends to make the two populations the same, equalizing 
the frequency of the markers in each population, and 
recombination destroys the covariance between marker 
and behavior. If recombination is strong, it dissipates the 
covariance between marker and behavior more rapidly 
than migration and imitation can create it. Even though 
the payoff advantage of being in the majority is sufficient
to maintain behavioral differences between the two pop­
ulations, these differences do not become ethnically 
marked. When individuals are unable to assort accu­
rately on the basis of markers (e is large), the pattern is 
similar: stable group differences in behavior may emerge 
and persist, but selection on markers is too weak to gen­
erate covariance between marker and behavior.
The qualitative arguments are supported by systematic 
sensitivity analysis. We determined the range of param­
eters under which groups become marked by performing 
a large number of simulations. For each simulation we 
calculated the value of D, the population average covar­
iance between behavior and marker, averaged over the 
10 0  simulations. We held parameter values constant at 
m = 0 .0 1 ,  e = 0.3, r  = 0 .0 1 ,  <5 =  0.5, for parameters not 
varied in a run of simulations. Figure 3 summarizes these 
results. When biased imitation can maintain stable be­
havioral differences in the face of migration, stable 
marker differences evolve provided that (1) recombina­
tion (r) is not too strong and (2) individuals interact suf­
ficiently often with individuals like themselves [e is not 
too high). There are no cases in which behavioral differ­
ences fail to evolve and marker differences manage to 
become stable.
2. Spatial structure is needed to generate ethnic mark­
ers but not to maintain them. Migration between groups 
generates the initial covariance essential for the evolu­
tion of ethnic markers. However, if individuals are able 
to use markers to assort accurately (e « 1), spatial struc­
ture is no longer necessary to maintain ethnic markers 
once such covariance arises (fig. 4) and groups end up 
mixed together in space, but high covariance between 
markers and behaviors remains. This configuration can 
only be a stable equilibrium if r  and e are very small. 
However, for somewhat larger values of r  and e, there is 
a long transition period during which two ethnically 
marked types are present without spatial variation. A 
more complex model in which groups occupied different 
niches would likely be able to sustain spatially mixed 
ethnically marked groups in a wider range of circum­
stances. Also, we will demonstrate later that natural se­
lection would reduce values of r  and e if at all possible. 
This makes the possibility of the evolution of such spa­
tially blended systems more likely. Such situations are 
an interesting and unexpected outcome of our model.
3. Increasing the number of populations increases the 
range of initial conditions that give rise to ethnic mark­
ers. Random starting conditions (random frequencies of 
behavior and marker in each group) often lead to the 
evolution of behaviorally different and marked groups, 
and this result becomes more likely as more groups are 
added to the system (fig. 5). The two-group system is 
most sensitive to starting conditions, as this case has the 
highest chance of randomly generating all groups with 
similar initial behavior frequencies.
4. Group differences are strongest at boundaries. 
When more than two groups are arrayed in space, the 
correlation between marker and behavior (R = 
DkH ukvk) is greatest at the boundaries between culture 
areas. Figure 6 shows the steady state in ten populations
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Fig . 2. The feedback process that generates marked groups and the forces that oppose this process.
arranged in a stepping-stone ring. This steady state re­
sults from an initial clinal distribution of behavior and 
marker frequencies with zero correlation between be­
havior and marker in each population. There is a region 
of three populations in the middle in which the fre­
quency of marker i and behavior i is low and a region
of three populations at the edges in which these fre­
quencies are high (remember that the populations wrap 
around so that population i exchanges migrants with 
population 10). In both of these regions there is little or 
no correlation between marker and behavior. In between 
these regions are boundary areas in which frequencies
F ig . 3. The evolution of stable marker differences. White regions, combinations of parameter values that pro­
duced both stable behavioral and marker differences (that is, these populations became ethnically marked). 
Black regions, cases in which behavioral differences were stable but marker differences were not (that is, these 
populations became culturally different but without ethnic markers). Gray regions, cases in which behavioral 
differences failed to evolve, typically because of strong migration.
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F i g .  4 . The frequencies of each the four com binations 
of behavior and marker over tim e in each of tw o pop­
ulations, The behaviors are denoted by  the shape of 
the symbol, circle ( =  o )  or square ( =  j ) ,  and the 
markers are denoted by color, black ( =  o) or white ( =  
1 ). The in itia l conditions and value of m  are the same 
as in figure 1 , bu t now  assortm ent is perfect, e =  0.0, 
and there is no recombination, r =  0.0, A s before, at 
first, rare-type disadvantage causes the behavior 1  to 
become more com m on in population 1  and behavior o 
in population 2, and migration generates a positive  
covariance between m arker 1  and behavior 1  (equa­
tion 4). However, because there is no recombination, 
this covariance builds up m uch more rapidly, espe­
cially in population  1 , in which the in itia lly  relatively  
more com m on marker was also absolutely more com ­
mon, The high correlation between m arker and be­
havior com bined w ith the accurate assortm ent elim i­
nates rare-type disadvantage, and migration m ixes the 
tw o groups un til they are identical. Because the co­
variance increases more rapidly in population 1 , the 
marker-behavior variant in  population 2 experiences a 
transient advantage tha t is preserved at equilibrium,
are intermediate and there is substantial correlation be­
tween marker and behavior.
5. A  more general m odel of social interaction leads to 
similar results. So far we have assumed that social in­
teraction can be modeled by a game of pure coordination 
with equal average payoffs for both equilibria. Symmet­
ric, pure coordination games are very special because the
basins of attraction of the two equilibria are the same 
size. To test whether our results were sensitive to this 
assumption, we ran a number of simulations in which 
we varied the parameters of the completely general two- 
person coordination game shown in table 2.
The results indicate that the system regularly evolves 
toward marked, behaviorally distinct groups even when 
there are large deviations from the perfect coordination 
structure. Thus our results do not depend in a sensitive 
way on the perfect nature of the game structure we have 
chosen. This suggests that any stable behavioral equi­
libria, regardless of their relative consequences for group 















0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
D
F i g .  5 . Equilibrium absolute values of D  (covariance 
in the population as a w hole) for sim ulations invo lv­
ing tw o groups (top, 100 s im ulations) and six  groups 
(bottom, 100 simulations). Starting conditions were 
random w ith parameter v^alues m = 0.02s, r = 0.10 , e 
= 0.30, 5 = 0 .5 0 . High D  becomes more like ly  as the 
num ber of groups increases.
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T A B L E  2,
Payoffs in a General Two-Person Game with 
Two Stable Equilibria
Player a 's Behavior
Player i 's Behavior i  o
F i g .  6. The steady state that arises from slightly 
clinal initial distributions of the frequencies of 
marker i  and behavior i  in ten populations arranged 
in a ring. Broken line, p1;- heavy solid line, q1;- light 
solid line, R.
E V O L U T I O N A R Y  S T A B I L I T Y  O F  T H E  P A R A M E T E R S
This model depends on four parameters: m, 8, r, and e. 
The first two formalize assumptions about the ecology 
of the evolving populations. The second pair of param­
eters represents assumptions about human psychology. 
The simulation results indicate that social interactions 
in which common behaviors have high payoff will lead 
to the evolution of ethnic markers if both e and r are 
small, or, in other words, if people have a psychology 
that predisposes them to interact with individuals with 
the same marker as themselves and to acquire some 
markers and behaviors as a package. Natural selection 
will, all other things being equal, favor such a psychology 
(that is, selection will favor mutations that reduce the 
values of e and r). However, selection on other aspects 
of social learning and demands on interaction may re­
strict the extent to which selection can reduce these 
parameters.
D I S C U S S I O N
We have argued that ethnic markers do not function to 
allow individuals to direct altruism to others like them­
selves because such a system cannot resist invasion by 
cheaters who signal altruistic intent but then do not de­
liver. In contrast, ethnic markers can signal one's be­
havioral type when social interactions have a coordi­
nation structure because in such situations there is 
nothing to be gained from cheating. Both parties in the 
coordination setting gain the most when they honestly 
advertise their strategy, and as a result both the behavior 
and its advertisement spread when the successful are 
imitated. Axtell, Epstein, and Young (1999) have ana-
1  i + S + g i -  A
o 1  1  +  6
n o t e :  Payoffs shown for player i ;  6, g, and h are as­
sumed to be positive.
lyzed another model that is quite different structurally 
but works for similar reasons.
The intuition that ethnic markers and cooperation are 
related is not, however, without merit. Humans are pe­
culiar in that we often cooperate with large numbers of 
unrelated individuals. As we have argued, the existence 
of ethnic markers alone cannot explain the scale of hu­
man cooperation. Yet we have shown that markers may 
evolve when individuals interact in a two-person coor­
dination game, and we believe that any process that leads 
groups to occupy multiple stable equilibria may produce 
the same result. Two of us have argued at length else­
where that human cooperation results from norms en­
forced by socially created rewards and punishments 
(Boyd and Richerson 1990, 1992; Soltis, Boyd, and Rich­
erson 1995; Richerson and Boyd 1998, 1999). If punish­
ment is sufficiently costly, such systems can stabilize a 
very wide range of behavior. Then, competition between 
groups will lead to the spread of moral systems that en­
hance group survival, welfare, and expansion, including 
norms that lead to enhanced cooperation in economic 
and military activities.
As a result, we expect that systems of moral norms, 
some of which create group-beneficial cooperation, 
should come to be marked by ethnic markers by the 
process described above. Punishment transforms the 
prisoner's dilemma structure of a cooperation problem 
into a coordination structure. The process we have de­
scribed here can then lead to individuals' selecting in­
dividuals with whom to cooperate on the basis of mark­
ers, but the markers themselves do not stabilize the 
cooperation.
C O R O L L A R I E S  A N D  P R E D I C T I O N S
The goal of this kind of modeling study is to demonstrate 
the cogency of a deductive argument linking assump­
tions about microlevel social interactions to the empir­
ically observable macrolevel social patterns that result. 
Accordingly, we conclude by describing several testable 
predictions of the model.
Our analysis of the evolutionary stability of e and r 
makes two predictions about the psychological tenden­
cies of human beings:
1. Individuals in marked communities should prefer 
interaction with similarly marked individuals. Our
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analysis of the evolution of e, the rate at which individ­
uals interact at random with respect to markers, suggests 
that natural selection or an analogous process operating 
on cultural rules for interaction should reduce e to zero, 
if possible. Thus, to the extent that e represents a psy­
chological bias toward interacting with those who look 
like oneself rather than the ability or freedom to interact 
with ones like oneself, we expect members of marked 
communities to prefer individuals marked like them­
selves, at least when it comes to coordination inter­
actions.
2. Individuals in marked communities should acquire 
bundles of at least some norm and marker traits. While 
the model does not suggest anything about the social 
learning of noncoordination behaviors and social mark­
ers, our analysis of the evolution of r, the rate of recom­
bination of behavior and marker traits, predicts that, for 
our model to be relevant, individuals should acquire 
norm and marker traits as a bundle. They should also 
preserve these associations throughout substantial por­
tions of their life spans. If this is not true, the process 
we describe here is unlikely to work.
The model makes three clear predictions about the 
nature of the distributions of marker traits and their re­
lations to ethnic groups and their histories:
1. Ethnic differences should be stronger at boundary 
regions than deep within ethnic territories. Hodder 
(1977) suggests that this is true for some ethno-archeo- 
logical data from the Lake Baringo region of Kenya, but 
the data are inadequate to test this prediction. The ap­
propriate test would be examination of a large ethnic 
group, such as the Kikuyu of Kenya, which interacted at 
many border areas with a number of different ethnic 
groups. Another setting that holds promise for testing 
this prediction is fragmentary migration that brings 
smaller units of a larger ethnic population into contact 
with other ethnic groups. If these groups are on average 
more marked than their source populations, we may be 
able to conclude that interaction with the other ethnic 
groups has increased selection on markers and magnified 
initial differences in those settings.
2. Norm and marker boundaries should coincide, 
while the distributions of other culture items may map 
onto one another differently. Our model makes no pre­
dictions about the nature of all cultural traits and the 
distribution of ethnic markers. However, if this model 
is correct, a number of norm differences—on beliefs in 
inheritance, child rearing, household labor, and other 
categories of human life in which there are multiple co­
ordinated solutions to the same problem—should cor­
respond to the distributions of marker differences.
3. Potential marker traits with the greatest initial dif­
ferences should become marked first. One test of this 
prediction would be to examine ethnographic settings in 
which two isolated source populations have contributed 
migrant groups that have since been in contact for some 
time. The source populations provide estimates of the 
initial differences present in the migrant groups when 
they came into contact. The migrant groups provide es­
timates of the differences that might have grown from
those initial differences. This prediction will earn sup­
port if the traits with greater differences between source 
populations appear to have led to marked traits in the 
contact groups.
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